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Introduction
Both Industrial policy and regulation have important effects on
budget constraints of producer and consumer by changing relative prices
among industrial sectors. I discussed some of the effects of budget
constraint problem on my another paper before. Experiences in some
countries including Japan and U. S. tell us some important industries
including semi-conductor industry have typical and interesting industrial
characters.
In this paper I dare to study some theoretical thinking. I use my
several ideas and microeconomic tools necessary for analysis of industrial
policy and regulation. Particularly I would like to pay attention to two
problems. They are information problem and interface problem. I called
them so. Their problems affect an innovational technology and a barrier of
entry for enterprises and industries concerned. I am discussing some fatal
meanings using my new word "rivalry". This is the word surpassing the
classical and well-known one "competition".
*This is submitted to summing up my recent article published abroad.
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Entry problem and value of producer's information
In general rational producer is used to get his own subjective
estimation about market demand adding brought by the governmental
policy whether it is regulation including deregulation or industrial policy.
We introduce four terms adopted by producer, that is, situation (s;), action
(a), result (r) and utility (u). In term s;C= 1,2) s, explains that he can
produce by himself and S2 does that he can not by himself. Term a
explains that he coordinates amount of investment for R&D and
equipment. Term r explains he decides amount of his profit. u explains
volume of utility gotten by r. Formulating the above,
r(a, s;)
u (r(a, s;» = ur(a, s;) = f(a, s;)
we introduce prior probability p (s;) meaning producer's subjective
probability about s;. Expected value of utility is
E(a) = Lf(a,s;)p(s;)
Maximizing E(a),
Eo = Max Lf(a,si)p(S;)
Writing p(G lSi) conditional probability meaning credibility of the
information (G), that is, likelihood of the information and the posterior
information p (s; IG), we get the next Bayesian formula
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P(s;/G)=P(G/s;)p(s;)= p(G/s;)p(s;)
peG) L,p(G /sk)p(sd
Here likelihood means probability for getting the information G when the
situation s; occurs actually and the posterior information means that
probability the situation s; occurs when the information G are gotten.
In the above formula P (G) is probability getting the information G .
Then we get
£1 = Max L!(a,s;)p(s;/G)
Therefore value ofthe information (VI) is
When VI is positive, rational producer dares to pay price to get the
information G. We call this cost for getting information transaction cost.
Transaction cost is indispensable with his production cost for producer.
In a certain industry each of incumbent and entrant has to decide
whether he can produce all or the part of demand increasing by himself. Sj
means to be able to produce by himself and Sz does not. In this case a
means that he prepares to invest for R&D and equipment rationally.
Next r means that he plans to increase his profit as large as possible. At
last! means amount of his utility gotten from his profit. Therefore we see
the information G depends on his own thinking of the content indicated
from governmental policy whether he is able to produce by himself or not,
when market demand increases. If additional market demand is null, he
does not need the above estimation at all. Here market demand adding
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means shifting of market demand curve to the right.
In Figure i-b DD is market demand curve before shifting and D' D' is
that after shifting. SS is market supply curve and moves to the right as a
new next entrant enters into the industry. They are SS, S' S', S" S" in
order from the left side. In Figure i-a LAC and LMC are long-run
average cost curve and long-run marginal cost curve. As a new next
entrant enters into the industry they move upward gradually. They are
LAC', LAC" and LMC', LMC". The initial equilibrium point is point E.
Mter shifting it is point EI .
Market price is determined at the intersection of DD curve and a
series of SS curves. Points E, E], E2 and E, are equilibrium points after
shifting. Soon after DD curve shifts to the right at first, the market price
is the highest and profit of incumbent is the biggest. But the process of
entry of new entrants induces the market prices to fall gradually. There
are P", p", and P' in order from the upper level. It is interesting that price
falling and cost rising occur simultaneously. Probably final market price
will be determined somewhere between upper price P" and bottom price
Figure 1 Prototypic Process of Entry between Incumbent and Entrant
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P'. The final equilibrium price is pm in this diagram. The output of market
is Q and that of individual producer is q (E q = Q). By shifting of DD
and 88 curves Q moves in order Q ' , Q" and Q ", . In rivalry the output of
market increases necessarily. But that of individual producer may
increase or may not (q";:;;; q'). When LAC and LMC curves shifts
diagonally to the right, q" may be larger than q' . That is dubious. At that
time profits of incumbents and entrants may be null or positive. We can
understand that if the profit is null, the present market is very
competitive in the long-run. If the profit is positive, we can call it rivalry
as is discussed in the latter part. In rivalry the amount of profit is a
rectangle with shadow in this diagram. We can call curve 8*8* market
supply curve in the long run.
Characteristics approach of production and
consumption -interface problem-
We can draw a model concerning the interrelation among extent of
efficiency and that of entry. In according to new demand theory by
Lancaster we introduce two characteristics, that is, cost falling or price
falling and competition promoting or entry promoting. The former is
technological factor and the latter is institutional factor. An amount of
industrial funds are allocated on the strength of above two factors. Here
there are four industries producing four different kinds of products. These
are bank, electric communication, automobile and transportation. Figure
2 depicts some of combination of these two kinds of industrial funds. We
can call the boundary line ABCD with four corners characteristic frontier.
Every point on this frontier is efficient. But every point on such three
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partial lines as AC, BD and AD is not efficient. Because these three
partial lines locate inside of characteristic frontier concerned. The points
on these three lines are never chosen. The enterprise and industry would
not like to invest for R&D and equipment by using the amount of
industrial funds. Ceteris paribus, only when price of product of electric
communication industry falls, point B have to move in the direction of the
north-east. If the extent of price falling is considerably large, the
characteristic frontier must be drawn as new frontier AB'D. Now point C
is inside this new frontier. Next we can expect the industry of automobile
will realize more cost falling and / or more competition promoting. But
here I dare to call two things cost falling factor and rivalry promotion
factor. Rivalry is new word as I will mention soon after. In this case we
can expect that price falling in the sector of electric communication will
induce the prices of bank and transportation industries to fall, owing to
the effect of Marshallian pecuniary externality. In fact price falling of
products increases surely consumers' demand and producer's profit. The
enterprise which fails to carry out price falling, that is, fails to interface
consumer's rational behavior with producer's rational behavior, is given
up by most of consumers and is compelled to exit from his market. This is
an interface problem between production and consumption. The first
change of price of individual industrial effectuates a chain reaction of
change of prices in several other industries. Here we can see change of
relative prices among several industries. Each rational producer has to
follow this chain reaction in order to schedule his efficient production. In
this diagram there are two social indifference curves /, and lz. lz has
higher utility than /, . Here we can regard this social indifference curve as
a kind of national taste related with policy decision line. An optimal point
-118-
A Logic of Industrial Policy and Regulation 783
is not that of intersection between the line B'D and II but a tangent point
between the line B'D and higher indifference curve lz.
Industrial climate and socio-economic complexity
The international war in the main industries seems to be endless.
Many economic researchers explain efficiency of industrial organization
depend on the extent of competition in main and international industries.
They believe the larger extent of competition in market becomes, the
larger extent of efficiency in organization of industries concerned
becomes. Is this significant postulate true? It is stupid of us not to notice
the difference of perfect competition and excessive competition. To be
honest this problem appears in discussing significance of competition all
the time. Meaning of two words Perfect and excessive looks similar at a
glance. It is true that the former means competition is excessive but the
Figure 2 Two Characteristics Approach in Production and Consumption
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latter means rivalry is excessive. So what do we mean by the word of
competitive oligopoly for instance? In this paper new word rivalry means
more differential and less excessive among products. In rivalry the
producers produce differential goods but have many competitors. Here I
should like to adopt a concept of rivalry with a familiar concept of
competition. In fact there are many industrial situations saying that
economic competition is too little and economic rivalry is too much. We
need to remember that extent of rivalry isn't equivalent to extent of
monopoly. Many outstanding economists have taught us definition of
competition only as concept preceding to that of monopoly. The things
conditioning this new concept of rivalry are as follows. The first is that
price is not always distant from marginal cost. So-called excessive
competition occurs often in the situation of perfect competitive industry.
This fact doesn't mean too little competition but does too rivalry. The
second is that differentiation of products exists surely in the market with
a rather unsymmetrical information among producers. Although for
instance we seem to be no differentiation among typical parts of semi-
conductor by different makers, being subject to mass-productive method,
the difference of nation and name of each maker name, that is, brand
name forms a vital differentiation of product. The third is that barriers of
entry exist surely but is entirely dependent on the extent of production
cost performance and amount of R&D and equipment investment in one
year. As the actions of entry take place frequently both in the industry of
semiconductor products and the installation industry of the same
products, we can call the above situation action of conditional free entry.
In semi-conductor industry most of the characteristic and specific
points of industrial organization are kept without reserve, I believe. Could
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we explain the industrial situations of competition and rivalry? It is safe
to say that the helpful hints for the problem exist rightly in the
technological characteristics. As a general rule technology has a dense
relation with three vital economic and managerial sites. I should like to
relate the above context with three performance marks of cost, demand
and market mainly in the case of two countries, U. S. and Japan. We can
see the difference of socio-economic structure of technology in two
countries. In microscopic sense, most of economists look like thinking that
the entrepreneur's innovational technology need rational
entrepreneurship in production and competitive entrepreneurship in
market in order to give his own advantage coming from more large extent
of competition to entrepreneurs. Speaking from a view of economic aspect
technology is not always dependent on interaction of demand and supply
in competitive market, and it has also little mutual relation with
economic rationality and productive efficiency. Here we can see some of
roots of socio-economic complexity.
In economic competition any entrepreneur can't yet survive unless he
uses his weapon named his new business opportunity of advantage
coming from new innovational technology. in his own economic and
managerial world, as professor Hayek taught us. Also although by
invisible Goddess' Hand the merit of every entrepreneur's economic
opportunity disappears sooner or later, any entrepreneur has yet strong
incentive to create new innovational technology. Even if an equilibrium
has come, he can break its equilibrium and readjust the market by using
his own strong incentive sooner or later. He can always endeavor to
decrease total production cost by falling labor cost and the other
production cost including transaction cost, only when he can do it by his
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own strong incentive coming from expectation of additional advantage for
new technological innovation. We can research mainly innovational
technology contributing to performance of cost and market. Generally
speaking the advantage of technological innovation leads necessarily to
performance of cost and market through falling of cost and readjusting of
market. Technology itself doesn't always fall cost, but entrepreneurs'
effort to adapt his own technological innovation to the basic R&D
research, production process and product differentiation necessarily
decrease his total cost. Those are because investment for R&D and
equipment are very important and feasible strategies in entrepreneurs
and industries concerned. Compared to entrepreneurs and industries of
U. S. and Japan, we can see some plain points of difference in socio-
economic factors of two countries. Which of them is the most critical?
A pre-history of semi-conductor industries tells us the truth in part.
For instance, the market share of Japanese industry in this business
world has changed considerably in each past ten-years-period, especially
in 1970's, 1980's and 1990's. I'm afraid most of economists use the term,
that is, competition without knowing well the term, that is rivalry. As
rivalry isn't mere economic phenomena, it has surely socio-economic and
even political facets. To put it shortly, rivalry has close relation with the
phenomena of socio-economic and even cultural complexity. A certain
scientist knowing the production spot tells us the following that if
Japanese entrepreneur has a definite target and does it in the long-run,
his innovational creativeness must be revealed at the best. On the
contrary U. S. and the other countries including Europeans and Asians
don't always hate losing their sales share in the market and dislike to
behave according to the tacit consent with other enterprises in the same
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industry. In Japanese society people don't always hate the same kind of
opinion as the other's. So they don't be worried about troublesome things
between the others' opinions. In this society there is a basic structure of
one strong lope tied up into a bundle, with their standing side by side. But
in the other countries' societies each member looks like a massive and
heavy stone bound loosely by a thin lope. When one of them starts to
move, the other doesn't move and is standing still with no influence each
other. Probably this is something of democracy, I think. However things
are rightly different in Japan. Speaking in the same way, when one stone
stars to move, every stone starts to move all together. This is notorious
complexity of consensus in Japanese customs. In other words this way is
the above tacit consent. But we can not assert that this custom is quite
unlikely to be a kind of democracy.
Professor. Morishima, in his book, showed his unique view regarding
Japanese case as M. Weber had analyzed socio-economic relations
between capitalism and rational spirits in 19 th century's European
society. Of course his work is merely one tried essay, but his opinion is
stimulating very much for researchers of comparative analysis between
Japanese enterprises and industries and the other countries' ones. But no
matter how eagerly he endeavored to search the role of Confucianism in
Japanese history. I wonder yet whether that the Confucian spiritual
climate of Japanese is able to explain economic success of Japan in
industrial developed economy. But speaking as a general rule ethical and
religious spiritual climate factors are not always useful for giving a final
answer of the problem, that is, "Why any country, for instance, U. S.
succeeded in economic competition once more in the second half of the
1990's?" Though we must know there is any vital relation between
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something of ethical factor and industrial success of the country, we
should not to expect a persuasive and useful interpretation for the above
respectable and controversial matter yet.
Though many economists used to understand that iron industry is
plainly different from semiconductor industry from the viewpoint of
competitive oligopoly. Though competitive oligopoly is one type of
homogeneous oligopoly, its concept includes many important parts which
can't be explained by only help of orthodox economic theory. By examining
semiconductor industry here are both price falling and investment for R &
D and equipment. Some economists believe that essence of oligopoly
consists in non-price competition. Strictly speaking this postulate is not
correct. The core of this problem doesn't insist in price falling but cost
falling. So we had better consider an interrelation between cost falling
and investment for R&D and equipment. Which is the first thing to do
among the two? Many people must think that suitable success of
investment for R&D and equipment comes to realizing cost falling.
Saying paradoxically, I dare to say success of cost falling leads to
investment for R&D and equipment with a powerful guide. We need to
notice that specially in the semiconductor industry we cannot tell rightly
the difference between price falling induced by cost falling and by
mismatch in economic relation of demand and supply in the market. Rate
of price change depends on that of cost change. Formulating this context,
mark-up principle is
dP /dt = dLMC Idt(l + m)
Here P, LMC, m and t are price, marginal cost in the long-run, mark-up
and time. Indeed in the case ofthe latter mentioned above the price is apt
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to fall more rapidly than in that of the former. Because the rate of cost
change in the latter is larger than that in the former. We can say mark-
up m changes with height of return of investment. Most of technological
analysts say the larger pieces of chip engineers can get from a piece of
wafer, the better technological precision they have on a piece of chip. In
this industry degree of precision of high technology depends just on how
many pieces of chips they can cut off. An efficient cost falling enables
them to sell at lower price and to increase their own share of sales by the
other root. This fact induces them to implement larger investment for R &
D and equipment surely and swiftly. Then the return of this investment
determines mark-up m. Especially in the 1980's Japanese enterprises
have implemented an enormous amount of investment even in the midst
of depression. In this case hesitating timely investment is not forgiven for
entrepreneur's own survival. This used to be rule patterned by Japanese
enterprises. But I guess this is not a rule peculiar to Japanese
enterprises. We can observe that in the period of low growth of the
country there is an excessive competition not only in the textile industries
and the like in chronic depression but also in the industries of semi-
conductors, automobiles and home-electronics which their growth of
demand is rather high. The characteristic in point was that we could see
falling price in the long-run with the rise of efficiency or productivity.
This type of oligopoly which I dare to call competitive oligopoly rivalry
here, is apt to have considerably high extent of concentration of sellers,
but to change frequently their order of ranking in the percentage of share
in the global market. When each producer has continued to win large
merits coming from economy of scale and technological innovation, he
faces to a kind of market structure, rivalry by name in a phase of
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investment for R&D and equipment. Speaking from specific cycle in
semi-conductor industry and the relatives, the price of product falls
periodically in the long run or often radically in the short run. Even if the
price falls sharply, it can't be under the competitive lowest level with null
profit. I guess there must be plain economic reason for its mechanism. An
existence of this mechanism forms an important technological barrier for
entry coming from peculiar product differentiation proper. That is reason
why a change in the rate of share is rather small in this industry and the
producer concerned are able to keep up more large rate of profit on more
large mark-up m.
Now the basement of economic behavior is no doubt market economy.
Market economy means typical mode of economic transaction using
mainly market mechanism. We have two problems here. One is whether
several countries in international trade can offer any open opportunity for
free market transaction to his partners or not. This triggers a clear
friction of GDP incomes between several countries. In the case of two
countries it brings unusual trade friction between them. The other is how
government can discriminate trading products in her own system through
market mechanism. These problems relate with constructing specific firm
system in carrying out the feasible governmental policy, industrial policy
or deregulation. Many foreign researchers have thought that Japan has
developed her strength by means of protectionism in the international
trade in the help of her governmental policy, U. S. has implemented it by
means of free trade in the help of free enterprises. But this symmetric
relation is not always true. In other words in the 1990's the tables of
economic influence has turned in the economic development of two
countries. The above has taught us very interesting contrast between two
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main capitalist states. Saying more ironically though we could see some
phases of typical economic trade between Japan and U. S. in the past
times, we can merely balance of power in each trading area in the world,
without seeing the same phases between Japan and Asian countries in
these days. I cannot help guessing that this curious fact was caused by
admirable trick of an economic history and world-wide diffusion of socio-
economic complexity.
Let's go back to our main subject, that is, rivalry in oligopoly. The
following are about characters of rivalry of the industries concerned. The
main difference between competition and rivalry consists in the degree of
discretion of price and non-price strategies. Rivalry holds good to make
clear discretion of non-price strategy. In this kind of rivalry a
considerably high growth rate of demand lead up necessarily efficient
technological innovation whether the intermediate products are subject to
captive method of production or not. The advantage by the height of
rivalry can induce the entrepreneur concerned to realize such an
experience rule of cost, that is, learning by doing. Besides he is able to get
a large economic advantage from economy of scale and efficient
technological innovation. Efficient technological innovation means
innovation of process of production, products itself and new market for
sales including an additive investment for R&D and equipment. Sooner
or later a drastic price falling is realized in the market of rivalry. through
cost falling. In practice every semiconductor enterprise is an imperfectly
integrated organization unlike usual big steel enterprise with a perfectly
integrated one. Generally speaking an enterprise which the vertical
integration is highly organized has surely more technological
innovational efficiency. Actually organizations in most of Japanese
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semiconductor enterprises are not only integrated at the highest level are
but also general electronic appliances makers. This is noticeable feature
of Japanese semiconductor enterprises. Japanese makers often buy many
specific apparatuses and parts needed in their own process of production
from the other makers than their family partners. Even organizational
scientists cannot afford to understand rightly mechanism of comparative
advantage in the highly integrated organizations. For instance typical
enterprise producing both whisky and beer can always invest a large
amount of money earned at whisky business branch into beer business
branch. In the above same way many enterprises whose main products
are home-electronic ones can invest a lot of money earned at the same
branch into the semiconductor branch. This is an effective method
investment without economic risk in his market. What is the theoretical
framework explaining the industrial context of these features? As we have
seen that there are three vital features. The first is existence of
organizational vertical integration. The second is possibility of additive
investment for R&D and equipment induced by advantage of cost falling.
The third is height of rivalry raising own larger share of sales in the
market. All of three features belong to supply side factors. Now it is safe
to say that there are more three factors from the view of industrial policy
and deregulation as I mentioned before. The first is effectiveness of
change of relative prices among several products. The second is
effectiveness of controlling barriers of entry and the like through the
industrial policy concerned. The third is effectiveness of deregulatory
policies characterized by adjusting own budget constraint and that of
partnership or union.
As the other socio-economic aspect we should like to advise that a
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notorious second rule of thermodynamics has told us that entropy travels
straight to thermal death leaving the situations alone. Human beings are
able to use their wisdom organizationally and effectively by creating,
accumulating, processing and storing own scare resources and own
innovational knowledge of opportunities for survival. So they can put
increase of entropy back skillfully. Public interest means total of social
surplus being supported and created by individual interest. Properly
speaking the government used to implement a series of new regulations
under the slogan of priority of public interest in order to maximize social
surplus artificially. But the government will fail in the end. Although in a
human society the portion of total social surplus was shared among
private producers and consumers, private producers get larger portion of
it after all. The producer has been the only economic unit who shares
larger gain from additive investment for R&D and equipment. So-called
government failure has been caused by the fact that government herself is
not only an experimenter who experiments on creating public interest but
also an experimental testee suffering such a test.
In Japan there was a notable historical and industrial event. Many
people can never forget it. That happened from 1976 to 1979. Several
excellent researchers were delegated from famous five microelectronic
enterprises, that is, Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitubishi, NEe and Fujitu. They
worked in the same laboratory house and succeeded in their working
research of semi-conductor branch. It is important that the event
occurred under strong leadership of Japanese government MITI (Ministry
of International Trade and Industry). Japan has won an industrial
success and has increased her output and export of products of semi-
conductor. Some analysts believe that Japanese socio-economic system
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had justly brought such an industrial success as the above event
fortunately. We can call this fact a typical industrial policy in Japan. But
in modern protectionism we can observe the same kind of facts in the
other countries whether they win or lose in the end. As a recent case study
we have a remarkable instance of European aircraft company Airbus as a
modern version of industrial policy in an international sense. Of course
international industrial policy has a dense relation with another barrier
of entry, that is, tariff barrier. Even though it looks like that a strong
leadership by bureau of government has achieved fortunate success, the
result may bring an unexpected friction between the countries or areas
concerned. Saying from my theoretical view some principles of industrial
policy or regulation teaches us the following. Whether it is industrial
policy or regulation the character of public policy scheduled by bureau of
government is inclined to change from content regulated and planned to
one stressed on market mechanism under some assumptions. Some
institutional economists call this tendency a complementary deviation of
institutional system. Bureau of government falls into a certain of difficult
dilemma. This is not fail of government but success of government. In
short industrial policy and regulation show rightly artificial deviation
from given and well-defined equilibrium point. In this implication
deregulation is revival of deviated equilibrium point through changing
relative prices among industrial sectors.
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A Logic of Industrial Policy
and Regulation
Shosuke Takemura
Industrial policy has important effects on budget constraints of
producer and consumer by changing relative prices among industrial
sectors as well as regulation. I discussed some of the effects of budget
constraint problems using policy decision line on my another paper.
Experiences in some countries including Japan and U. S. tell us that some
important industries particularly including semi-conductor industry
have typical and interesting industrial problems and characters.
In this paper I dare to study a few of theoretical explorations and
some socio-economic facets. I use my several ideas and microeconomic
tools necessary for analysis of industrial policy and regulation.
Particularly I'd like to pay attention to two problems. They are
information problem and interface problem. I called them so. The
problems affect an innovational technology and a barrier of entry for
enterprises and industries concerned. Also I'm going to discuss some
industrial meanings using my new word "rivalry". This is a fatal word
surpassing the classical and well-known one "competition".
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